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Executive summary 
Digital identity systems are being enthusiastically adopted in Africa and Asia as a response to 
corruption, inefficient service delivery, high costs of doing business, and security threats. The 
expectation is that by establishing the identities of citizens and their entitlements and 
responsibilities, these systems will reduce the information asymmetries that allow rules to 
be violated. However, this assumes that developing countries have a rule of law that ensures 
that evidence on violations will lead to enforcement regardless of the identity and power of 
the violator.  
Debates in the United Kingdom and other advanced countries have centred around 
appropriate regulation and have been driven by the concern that identity data linked to 
multiple databases can lead to a loss of privacy that is not justified by improvements in 
security. But when the rule of law is weak – such is often the case in developing countries – 
there is the additional possibility of a deliberate misuse of data by the powerful, leading to 
rent extraction or political exclusion of different types. These are qualitatively different 
concerns and require a different analytical frame for assessing the likely impact of digital 
identity systems. 
In many developing countries we observe variants of rule by law, where enforcement has a 
higher likelihood of success when it benefits the more powerful party. In such contexts, 
reductions in the asymmetry of information achieved by digital identity systems can have 
anomalous effects, depending on the type of violation and the relative power of the parties 
involved. For some types of violations digital identity systems can have significant positive 
social effects, for example by mobilising the powerful to change rules in order to improve 
compliance and reduce fraud. However, for an important subset of violations, better 
information can strengthen the asymmetric power of extractive groups and support their 
ability to exclude and repress others further. Such systems can also contribute to economic 
exclusion through what we describe as the ‘premature formalisation’ of informal, small and 
medium-sized enterprises.  
We develop an analytical framework to explain the anomalous effects of digital identity 
systems, reviewing the available literature on relevant systems in Asia and Africa. We 
consider the need for asymmetric power analysis alongside asymmetric information analysis 
to understand the causes of, and possible policy responses to, rule violations, and introduce 
the political settlements framework as a lens for understanding the differences between 
digital governance and data concerns in developed countries compared to advanced 
countries. The theory and evidence suggest that a more robust analysis, which recognises 
the interdependence of asymmetric information and power, can assist in the design of 
country-specific, welfare-enhancing digital strategies. 
  
Digital identities: a political settlements analysis of asymmetric power and information 
 
4 
 
List of Acronyms 
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party (India) 
GST Goods and services tax (India) 
ID Identification 
IT Information technology 
MSEs Micro and small enterprises 
NRC National Register of Citizens (India) 
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises 
UIDAI Unique Identification Authority of India 
UID Unique identity number 
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1. Introduction 
Digital identity systems create unique identity numbers (UIDs) for each citizen linked to their 
unique biometric data. These numbers can then be linked to data on welfare rights, tax 
contributions, bank accounts and so on, creating a powerful tool to assist the enforcement 
of the formal rights, taxes, social entitlements and other responsibilities of citizens. 
Applications include tackling corruption and fraud in public delivery systems, creating new 
markets by reducing transaction costs and improving national security (World Bank 2014). 
Digital identities have been used to try to improve the delivery of public services, reduce 
election fraud, create and expand markets, improve security, accelerate formalisation, 
improve tax collection, and improve regulatory compliance. However, the evidence is mixed: 
in some areas digital identity systems have reduced corruption, improved service delivery 
and increased market activities by making it easier to establish identity, but they have also 
contributed to increasing economic and political exclusion in other areas. The potentially 
positive role of digital identity is based on the possibility of reducing the asymmetry of 
information, enabling some of the transaction costs of formal contracts to be reduced and 
contract violations to diminish. But these expectations are based on a number of critical 
assumptions. 
The primary assumption is that the society has a rule of law, by which we mean that the 
detection of violations will lead to enforcement regardless of the relative power of the 
violator and the injured party. With a rule of law, information is indeed power. 
Unfortunately, most countries, particularly developing ones, do not have a rule of law and at 
best have some variant of a rule by law (Khan 2010, 2018; North, et al. 2007; North, et al. 
2009). In the latter, laws and institutions are unequally enforced and the chances are that 
the powerful will enforce rules on the less powerful, but not necessarily, or always, the other 
way around. For instance, the prime minister may be able to get the anti-corruption 
commission to prosecute the leader of the opposition (who may indeed be corrupt), but the 
leader of the opposition is unlikely to be able to get the anti-corruption commission to 
prosecute the prime minister (who may also be corrupt). These power asymmetries can run 
right through society, with more powerful or better-connected individuals and organisations 
having a systematic enforcement advantage over less powerful ones. In these societies, the 
detection of contract violation does not necessarily lead to enforcement unless the 
aggrieved party is more powerful than the violating party.  
In rule-by-law societies, the relationship between asymmetric information and asymmetric 
power can be complex. A reduction in information asymmetries, for instance due to digital 
technologies, may reduce power asymmetries in some areas, but it may also result in power 
asymmetries increasing in other areas. The distribution of power in a society or sector, 
which we describe as the political settlement, is likely to determine what happens to 
enforcement if information improves. As a result, the specific application of digital identities 
can determine the welfare impact. In some applications, the use of digital identities can shift 
the balance of power further against already excluded groups. For instance, it could result in 
premature formalisation that makes low-productivity activities go out of business and result 
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in greater economic exclusion or create new opportunities of rent extraction and political 
control for powerful groups that results in greater political exclusion. Adverse effects of 
these types may outweigh welfare-enhancing enforcement gains elsewhere. This makes it 
important to examine the interdependence of information and power, particularly in the 
context of societies where power is very unequally distributed to begin with, and the rule of 
law is weak. In these cases, contract violations based on asymmetries of power cannot be 
addressed by reducing asymmetries of information, and the latter may actually make 
matters worse for some types of violations. Other strategies have to be considered, 
including directly addressing structural power asymmetries. 
International development partners including the World Bank have been promoting the 
advancement of digital identities in developing countries, particularly in Africa, without 
always understanding the complex relationships between asymmetric information and 
power in contexts of a weak rule of law. According to the World Bank, Africa accounts for 
around 15% of the world’s population but around half of the world’s population without 
legal national identification (NID), and is therefore particularly in need of developing these 
systems (World Bank 2017: 4, 2014). The experience of India with its well-developed 
Aadhaar identity system – which gives every citizen a unique identity number linked to 
multiple databases – is often used as an exemplar of the advantages that can follow. 
Aadhaar has multiple objectives, including improving the efficiency of transfers and service 
delivery (particularly to the poor), reducing resource leakages, and improving security, but it 
has also been used in other ways that are more questionable and has contributed to 
widening the asymmetries of power in important dimensions.  
Based on their reading of experiences of countries like India, the World Bank’s Digital 
identity toolkit encourages African states to invest in identity infrastructure as ‘digital 
identity, or electronic identity (eID), offers developing nations a unique opportunity to 
accelerate the pace of their national progress. It changes the way services are delivered, 
helps grow a country’s digital economy, and supports effective safety nets for disadvantaged 
and impoverished populations’ (World Bank 2014: vii). It goes on to say: ‘Today’s modern 
society creates new demands on identity: identity has to be mobile, transactional, 
interoperable, portable, and social – in addition to being secure’. The report recognises that 
there are issues of privacy and trust but assumes that these can be addressed by legislation 
and regulatory frameworks. Similarly, it is optimistic about the commercial benefits of 
mobile and transactional identity data and ignores the challenges of regulating the 
concentrations of market power that are likely to follow. Most importantly, it ignores the 
limited efficacy of regulations as a way of protecting the misuse of data in countries where 
the rule of law is weak. This does not mean that we should be opposed to digital identity 
systems, but we need a more robust analytical framework to assess the opportunities and 
dangers.  
Advocates of digital identity point out the evidence from Aadhaar and other early adopters 
which shows that leakages of cash transfers meant for the poor have indeed declined in 
some contexts and that digital identities have reduced transaction costs, for instance in 
setting up bank accounts for previously excluded groups (Gelb and Clark 2013; Department 
Digital identities: a political settlements analysis of asymmetric power and information 
 
7 
 
of State 2011: 7; GSMA 2017; Muralidharan, et al. 2017). However, there is also evidence 
that the linking of identities to tax, welfare and other databases can make informal 
businesses unviable as a result of premature formalisation (Dibben, et al. 2015; La Porta and 
Shleifer 2014). More worryingly, access to identity data can allow the powerful to control 
opposition more easily or to expropriate from particular groups more effectively, with 
adverse impacts on political and economic inclusion (Bukari and Schareika 2015; Ragas 
2017). In extreme cases, these systems make it technically possible to rapidly deprive 
targeted groups of the rights and services required for everyday life. In the context of ethnic 
and religious conflicts and contestations over citizenship, digital identities can be used to 
deprive targeted groups of access to banking, public-sector jobs, land transactions and the 
operation of sim cards, allowing coercive repression for political ends that, in extreme cases, 
can facilitate ethnic cleansing at the push of a button. A holistic analysis of the benefits and 
dangers of digital identity systems is therefore necessary, particularly in the context of the 
growing authoritarianism in many developing countries. It should be of particular concern 
that many authoritarian governments in developing countries are at the forefront of 
advancing and adopting digital identity systems.   
Digital identity cards have been rejected in a number of advanced countries because of their 
implications for privacy. There is also a pressing and related regulatory challenge in 
advanced countries as a result of the use of ‘big data’ by first-mover companies, which can 
create insurmountable entry barriers simply as a result of network economies of scale. The 
involvement of private-sector companies in designing digital identity systems in developing 
countries raises equivalent concerns. Although the appropriate regulatory response in 
advanced countries is not yet known because network economies raise new problems of 
defining the sources of monopoly power (as they are no longer based on directly preventing 
entry into markets), the expectation is that once the regulatory framework is agreed upon, it 
will be enforced. In developing countries, the challenge is more severe. If the rule of law is 
weak, regulatory solutions will not necessarily work because the regulations themselves will 
be difficult to enforce. The appropriate strategy may be to determine the pace of 
digitisation, and the uses to which digital identities should be restricted in different contexts.  
In section 2 we look at some of the privacy and data concerns in advanced countries and the 
differences between the digital governance concerns in advanced and developing countries. 
In advanced countries the concern is primarily with appropriate forms of regulation but in 
developing countries this is insufficient to assure desirable outcomes. In section 3 we 
consider the need for asymmetric power analysis alongside asymmetric information analysis 
to understand the causes of, and possible policy responses to, rule violations. We introduce 
the political settlements framework as a lens for understanding the differences between 
digital governance and data concerns in developed countries compared with advanced 
countries. In section 4 we develop an analytical classification of various types of rule 
violations in developing countries and describe the expected outcomes of enforcement 
using digital identity systems in each case. We review the available evidence on the rule 
violation to show that the empirical evidence supports our analytical expectations. To 
conclude, section 5 outlines some of the implications of our analysis for the global discussion 
around digital identity systems and appropriate strategies for development partners.   
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2. Digital identity and data issues in 
advanced and developing countries  
The potentially negative outcomes that can be triggered by digital identity systems have 
been of concern in advanced countries, but for different reasons than in developing 
countries. The United States, United Kingdom and Canada were at the forefront of 
developing digital identity systems in the aftermath of the Twin Towers attacks in New York 
in 2001. The aim was to improve the identification or exclusion of aliens and to track 
domestic suspects, however it was also hoped that there would be profitable opportunities 
for deploying identity data in service delivery. But very soon enthusiasm began to wane as 
privacy implications came to the fore. The UK Parliament’s Select Committee on Home 
Affairs recommended in 2004 that the proposed national identity system should go through 
‘exhaustive testing’ of biometric technology and vetting by experts to ensure there were no 
unexpected adverse effects (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2004: para 175 of 
Conclusions and Recommendations).  After extensive technical discussions, including the 
evaluation of available evidence, the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government 
terminated the UK’s identification (ID) card plans in 2010, describing it as unnecessarily 
‘intrusive’ (Guardian 2010).  
The debates in the UK and other advanced countries have been driven by the concern that 
identity data linked to multiple databases can lead to a loss of privacy that is not justified by 
improvements in security or service-delivery outcomes. Privacy is a code-word for saying 
that perfectly legitimate individuals may have on their records innocent events that they do 
not wish to explain to public officials. Moreover, by linking records, individuals may be 
picked up and forced to account for ‘red flags’, activities or transactions that serve no public 
purpose. Once multiple databases are linked to identities, it is also hard to prevent ‘function 
creep’, for instance sharing data with new agencies in areas like surveillance and security. If 
information is acted upon that is inaccurate, inadequately checked, or based on 
inappropriate red flags, this information may not be easy to correct, even when there is a 
rule of law, because individuals may not be aware that they are being tracked or why they 
have been prevented from engaging in some activities or transactions.  
Services based on digital identities are also prone to the concentration of market power 
even in advanced countries. First-mover companies are likely to enjoy huge network 
economies of scale because the more information a network can process or provide, the 
more attractive that network becomes for new customers. This can result in enormous 
market power emerging in entirely lawful ways, as in the case of the FAANGs (Facebook, 
Apple, Amazon, Netflix and Google/Alphabet) (Economist 2019a). Regulators in advanced 
countries are still grappling with the challenge of constraining these concentrations of 
market power in the public interest. The challenge is that this market power is not based on 
preventing entry into markets, on the contrary, the network economies allow first movers to 
provide better and cheaper services but also gives them huge power that may be socially 
undesirable. Banking is emerging as the next frontier for digital disruption, and new sources 
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of market power are likely to emerge in advanced countries over the next decade 
(Economist 2019b). Emerging asymmetries in market power are, however, second-order 
problems in developing countries compared to the illegitimate misuse of data by the 
politically powerful. Nevertheless, market-power issues can also affect developing countries. 
In particular, the growth of the digital economy in these countries can depend on identity 
data since other forms of identity-checking may be weak. This is already resulting in 
partnerships between private companies and states in developing digital identity systems, 
which can give first-mover companies significant market power. This can be doubly 
problematic if the rule of law is also weak.  
The concern in advanced countries is not that the politically powerful will illegitimately or 
illegally misuse information, because rules on how information can be collected and used 
are likely to be enforced. Rather, the concern may be that the data analysis may intrude on 
privacy or result in concentrations of market power when commercialised. Even with a rule 
of law, this can place many legitimate citizens in the difficult position of being tracked for the 
wrong reasons, often without their knowledge, and without clear mechanisms of exiting 
from wrongful scrutiny. Regulators also face challenges in defining restrictive market 
practices when there is ostensibly free entry into these markets. When the rule of law is 
weak there is the additional possibility of a deliberate misuse of data by the powerful, 
leading to rent extraction or political exclusion of different types, beyond the exercise of 
market power (Ramanathan 2017; Thakar 2018). These are qualitatively different concerns 
and require a different analytical frame for assessing the likely impact of digital identity 
systems in developing countries.  
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3. Asymmetric information and 
power 
The asymmetric information approach is widely used to analyse the causes of, and possible 
policy responses to, rule violations. The approach offers useful insights, but in developing-
country contexts it has to be complemented with an asymmetric power analysis. Asymmetric 
information problems arise whenever a ‘principal’ contracts with an ‘agent’ to provide a 
good or a service, but the principal has insufficient information to assess whether a poor 
outcome was because of fraud by the agent or some other reason. If the agent also knows 
that the principal does not have full information, the agent is likely to cheat the principal and 
get away with it. A wide range of policy failures have been attributed to simple or nested 
asymmetric information problems. These include citizens failing to observe what politicians 
are doing, which may allow politicians to deviate from manifesto promises, or politicians in 
turn failing to observe what bureaucrats are doing, allowing bureaucrats to divert resources 
or respond to offers of bribes.  
If contract violations are primarily due to asymmetric information problems, better 
information about the identities of principals and agents – linked to other data that allows 
their formal responsibilities and entitlements to be tracked – could help reduce information 
asymmetries, and therefore reduce corruption and improve accountability. From this 
perspective, digital identities linked to information on the services citizens are entitled to, 
their tax liabilities, regulatory reporting requirements and so on, would help to track the 
fulfilment of a variety of contracts. This is why supporters of digital identity systems believe 
they help to strengthen citizen rights, reduce corruption, improve the formalisation of the 
economy and help to implement development programmes.  
However, two critical assumptions are required to ensure that more symmetric information 
will actually improve welfare through a better enforcement of laws and contracts. The first 
assumption is that the country has a rule of law, which means that contracts are enforced 
once violations are revealed, irrespective of the power of the parties involved. In contrast, if 
the rule of law is weak, the effects of better information may depend on the power of the 
violator relative to those affected by the violation. A second assumption necessary for 
symmetric information to improve enforcement is that the laws and contracts in question 
are feasible, meaning that violators could in principle have complied with the rules. This may 
sound like a reasonable assumption, except that it is often not the case in developing 
countries. If compliance is not feasible for some or all individuals or organisations, better 
information about violations does not make it so. Instead, better information could either 
result in changes in laws if non-compliance affects the powerful, or it could further 
disadvantage the less powerful if the information is used to extract from them, to control 
them politically, or to shut them out.  
The weakness of the rule of law in developing countries is structural, and not deliberate or 
accidental. A rule of law means that laws can be enforced on everyone, including the 
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powerful. The powerful in advanced countries may have a greater say in making laws in line 
with their interests, but they have to follow the laws once they are there. Developing 
countries typically have variants of what we describe as rule by law, where enforcement 
depends on the relative power of the affected parties. In these contexts, if a less powerful 
individual or organisation violates a contract with a more powerful one, detection is much 
more likely to lead to contract enforcement than the other way around (Khan 2010, 2018). 
The degree of enforcement in these contexts can therefore depend not just on information 
but also on the relative power of the individuals or organisations affected. Asymmetric 
power is therefore another independent variable affecting the persistence of contract 
violation in addition to asymmetric information, but also interacting with it in ways that we 
will discuss.  
Of course, a rule of law on its own does not ensure inclusion or fair outcomes. Even with a 
rule of law, asymmetric power can prevent the drawing up of inclusive laws. Nevertheless, if 
there is a rule of law, once a law is made, its enforcement is not a significant concern. 
Greater inclusion can therefore be pursued through the legislation of fairer laws and 
contracts, for instance, by mobilising collective action by the excluded to demand legislation 
for greater inclusion. The powerful are also likely to use their influence to get laws and 
contracts interpreted in favourable ways. But with a rule of law, the disadvantaged or those 
adversely affected can mobilise to tighten legislation to make it more difficult to interpret 
laws in particular ways. This is currently playing out in Europe over issues like the right to be 
forgotten on the internet or face recognition being used by police forces without consent.  
The main difference between contexts with and without a rule of law is therefore that, in 
the latter, in addition to laws being formulated and interpreted in biased ways, they may also 
be enforced in biased ways. This is a very significant difference and allows for qualitatively 
different outcomes in terms of the scale and severity of exclusion.   
For a rule of law to emerge, a society must have a broad distribution of powerful 
organisations in different activities and with different interests. This ensures that any 
particular individual or organisation breaking rules is likely to be resisted by other powerful 
organisations acting in their own interest. For the powerful to want rules to be enforced on 
each other, it must also be the case that they require rule enforcement to sustain their high-
productivity activities. This happens when powerful organisations require complex contracts 
with many parties on an ongoing basis to carry out their high-value activities. These 
conditions are only likely to be found in advanced countries with diversified and competitive 
productive sectors. Powerful organisations in these societies will have an effective demand 
for generalised contract enforcement because they have the power to put pressure on 
politicians and bureaucrats to deliver and to pay for the delivery. Even though individuals 
will always have an incentive to free ride and violate rules, once any violations are detected, 
enforcement agencies can rely on the support of other powerful organisations to ensure 
enforcement, and the violator is likely to admit the error and take corrective action. 
Unfortunately, this configuration of power is rare, and few countries fulfil these 
characteristics, as both North et al.’s classification of Open Access Orders and Khan’s 
political settlements analysis point out (Khan 2018; North, et al. 2007; North, et al. 2009).  
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A ‘political settlement’ describes a reproducible distribution of organisational power in a 
society or sector. For a structure of organisational power to be reproducible, powerful 
organisations must have interacted to work out formal and informal institutions that give 
them access to the resources that reproduce this distribution of power. The distribution of 
power in developing countries can vary significantly, but the configuration shares some 
common characteristics. Unlike their counterparts in advanced economies, powerful 
organisations in developing countries often do not need, and therefore do not support, the 
enforcement of a rule of law; nor, given their capabilities, do they rely solely on formal 
institutions to generate their revenues. The variations in the distribution of power, rather 
than simply differences in custom and norms, plays an important role in explaining the 
varying levels of violations of rules by the powerful in developing countries, with high levels 
of corruption and informality (Khan 2019). While some enforcement problems may indeed 
be due to asymmetric information, many violations persist despite full information because 
the powerful are able to break rules and contracts with a low probability of punishment. 
Transparency does not always lead to accountability. These types of rule violations cannot 
be addressed with more information. 
In developing countries power is likely to be concentrated across a much smaller number of 
organisations, creating opportunities for rule violations that are unlikely to be effectively 
checked. Many powerful organisations may not be particularly productive or competitive 
and may not need a rule of law to sustain their activities. They are then more likely to rely on 
political and bureaucratic connections to access rents in informal ways, often violating 
formal rules. Even if they are relatively high-capability organisations in their context, they 
are often not competitive in global markets and are likely to be involved in relatively simple 
transactions with small numbers of other domestic organisations. For these they can rely on 
trust-based contract enforcement, or informal enforcement involving mafias, patron–client 
networks often within political parties, or informal arrangements with enforcement 
agencies. Without an effective demand from the powerful for impersonal rule enforcement, 
the emergence of a rule of law is unlikely.  
Under these conditions, information about violations may not lead to enforcement. Some 
violations may happen openly, others may be hidden for the sake of political form or to hide 
violations from competing groups who may use this information for their political 
advantage. Information about rule-violations may occasionally result in punishment if 
powerful groups use this information to mobilise support to displace competitors. However, 
these occasional instances of enforcement may have no systemic effects if the overall 
distribution of organisational power continues to allow rule violations by the powerful 
(Khan, et al. 2019). Occasional punishments of violators may simply result in the 
replacement of one powerful group with another, for instance when political incumbents 
use anti-corruption cases to get rid of competitors in opposition parties. These are instances 
of rule by law, where the enforcement of rules, including anti-corruption rules, happens 
when some powerful actors find it in their interest to selectively apply the law.  
While powerful and relatively high-capability organisations violate rules as part of 
accumulation strategies, a much larger number of lower-capability firms violate rules 
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because they find it difficult to adhere to formal rules. They are often collectively described 
as the ‘informal economy’. In Asia and Africa the informal economy accounts for 50%–80% 
of gross domestic product (GDP) and 70%–90% of employment (Schneider, et al. 2010; Chen, 
et al. 1999; Benjamin and Mbaye 2012). Informal-sector small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) and micro-organisations lack the capacity to comply with most formal rules such as 
those governing taxation, social and environmental regulations, labour laws, building codes, 
land and other registration requirements, and other regulatory requirements. They do not 
generate the income or profit to be able to make the investments required for compliance 
and record-keeping. This type of informality declines with economic development as 
organisations become more productive. However, the reverse does not follow; the rapid 
enforcement of rules on low-capability firms will not necessarily accelerate their productivity 
growth or their transition to formality. It is more likely to slow down their development or 
even close them down (La Porta and Shleifer 2014; Demenet, et al. 2016).  
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4. Classification and evidence of rule 
violations in developing countries 
In contexts with a weak rule of law, the impact of better information on enforcement is 
likely to depend on the type violation and the relative power of the violator. Table 1 
identifies four types of violations, distinguished by the relative power of the violator and 
whether the violator could have feasibly complied with the rule being violated. Violators can 
be more or less powerful than those affected by the violation or the agencies attempting to 
enforce the rule. Violations are also different depending on whether the violator is 
deliberately violating a rule that they may have complied with or is violating a rule they are 
unable to comply with.  
For violations of the types identified in cells 1 and 4 in Table 1, more symmetric information 
is likely to result in improved enforcement and lower corruption. But for the types of 
violations described in cells 2 and 3, the result is likely to be increased asymmetry of power 
and potentially more serious violations and exclusionary outcomes. In the next four sub-
sections, we explain our theoretical expectation for each cell, and review the literature on 
digital identity systems to show that the available evidence supports our analysis. 
Table 1: Effects of improved information on different types of violations  
  FEASIBILITY OF COMPLYING WITH VIOLATED RULE 
 
 Difficult  
(violator cannot comply) 
Feasible  
(but violator will not comply) 
RELATIVE 
POWER OF 
VIOLATOR  
High  
1. The powerful violate difficult rules 
Evasion aided by corruption 
Information may have positive effects by 
mobilising the powerful to change rules to 
improve compliance 
3. The powerful capture illicit rents 
Illicit rents, clientelist/populist politics 
Information likely to have negative effect by 
strengthening capacity to repress, control and 
extract from the less powerful 
Low 
2. The less powerful violate rules 
Particularly violations in informal economy 
Information likely to have negative effect if 
enforcement leads to economic exclusion or 
is used by the powerful to control and 
extract 
4. Fraud based on asymmetric information 
Opportunistic contract violations 
Information likely to have positive effects by 
reducing fraud as violators are not powerful and 
enforcement is likely to follow 
Source: The authors. 
The feasibility of compliance in Table 1 refers to how seriously compliance affects the 
bottom line. If compliance reduces profitability to below the normal or acceptable level, the 
rule is difficult to comply with. If profitability becomes zero or negative, the rule may be 
impossible to comply with. Feasibility therefore varies along a continuum. Some violations 
happen because the violator cannot comply with a difficult rule. But other violations happen 
because even though the rule is feasible, the violator will not comply in order to gain 
additional illicit benefits or rents.  
Digital identities: a political settlements analysis of asymmetric power and information 
 
15 
 
The relative power of the violator is relevant because we are interested in the probability of 
enforcement in contexts where the rule of law is weak. Individuals or organisations are 
powerful if they have greater holding power relative to others in contests over enforcement. 
This, in turn, depends on the economic and organisational resources they can mobilise. The 
location of individuals or organisations within the important pyramidal patron–client 
networks in developing countries is an important determinant of their ability to mobilise 
support, and therefore their holding power (Joseph 1987; Khan 2000). The greater the 
holding power of the violator relative to other affected parties and enforcement agencies, 
the more difficult it is to enforce rules on them regardless of information.  
The emerging evidence on the impact of digital identity systems in developing countries 
demonstrates the importance of distinguishing between these different types of violations. 
India is a useful case to examine because its Aadhaar system is often held up as an exemplar 
of an identity system based on a UID linked to the biometric data of each citizen. It has been 
described as ‘the largest biometric laboratory in the history of the modern world’ with the 
Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) enrolling 1.2 billion out of 1.31 billion 
citizens between 2010 and 2019 (Sen 2019; Ragas 2017). It was sold as a system that would 
reduce the corruption and fraud in public delivery systems.  
Other states in Africa and Asia have introduced digital identity systems with similar goals of 
reducing identity fraud, improving the targeting of welfare schemes, improving tax 
collection, and promoting cashless transactions. Digital identity projects often begin with 
voter registration, but a few began as national identity initiatives. Some African countries 
including Botswana, Kenya, Morocco and Rwanda are at advanced stages of coverage; 
others like Nigeria, Chad, Zambia, Cameroon, Tanzania, and Ethiopia are at intermediate or 
early stages. Most use a combination of biometrics and other data to create electronic 
databases to store identity information as a precursor to linking with other databases. 
Countries like Chad and Côte d’Ivoire already see their digital identity systems as a way of 
documenting stateless people and refugees (Clark 2017). We look at the evidence from Asia 
and Africa to evaluate the usefulness of the distinctions we have drawn between different 
types of violations in Table 1, and the likely effects of digital identity data on enforcement in 
each case.   
4.1. Violations when the powerful cannot comply with 
rules  
Cell 1 in Table 1 describes violations where the violators are powerful and are breaking rules 
that are difficult to comply with. We know from many sources, including the Doing business 
surveys of the World Bank,1 that many rules affecting even powerful or high-capability 
organisations in developing countries are dysfunctional in this sense. Rules may be complex 
 
 
1
 See https://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
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or even contradictory, in some cases deliberately so. Many rules may have been introduced 
without consultation with anyone and earlier contrary rules are never removed. Or the rules 
may have been copied from more advanced countries where the productivity and 
competitiveness of organisations is higher. Evasion sustained by bribes and speed money are 
likely to be widespread in these contexts. Heightened information requirements to stop 
these violations is unlikely to directly improve enforcement if the rules are actually 
unworkable. But pressure for compliance generated by better information available as a 
result of digital identity systems or otherwise is likely to drive changes in rules since the 
powerful are involved. Greater transparency about violations is likely to be inconvenient for 
powerful organisations, particularly if they are engaging in corruption to work around 
dysfunctional or excessively difficult-to-comply-with regulations. They are likely to override 
resistance (for instance from bribe-collectors) and force changes in rules that make 
compliance possible once detection becomes easier.  
We would therefore expect to see improvements in compliance, together with reductions in 
associated types of corruption. Moreover, digital platforms may suggest possible solutions 
to compliance problems by providing new and cheaper ways of speeding up registrations, 
simplifying and improving access to forms, or revealing exactly where the compliance 
requirements or procedures are dysfunctional or contradictory. Digital information may 
therefore create both strong incentives for reform as well as providing tools for making 
feasible improvements. Even before the digital identity process began, repeated rounds of 
the World Bank’s Doing business surveys identified specific areas where regulatory 
requirements had excessively high transaction costs in particular countries, and this allowed 
countries to focus on and simplify specific areas of concern. Digitisation may simply make 
further simplification along these lines feasible and make compliance easier in specific areas.  
India’s relatively more developed digital identity system provides useful insights into the 
types of improvements that can be achieved. Digitisation around Aadhaar helped India 
improve its Doing business rankings in several ways. The Aadhaar identity allowed the 
development of a set of software interfaces called the ‘India Stack’ that developers and 
service providers could access to build and provide value-adding services that required 
identity data. The first layer of the stack, called ‘know-your-customer’, electronically verifies 
the identity of customers applying for various services and maintains verified paperless 
records. The ‘cashless’ layer came into being in 2016 with the Unified Payments Interface 
(UPI), which allows an effective real-time mobile payments system for peer-to-peer and 
inter-bank transfers. This established a single identifier using Aadhaar that could be used to 
conduct transactions on a recurring basis without the use of credit/debit cards or bank 
details. The introduction of paperless and digital identification and payments systems made 
it faster to process a range of paperwork, for instance to get construction permits, or to set 
up or liquidate companies. These simplifications contributed to India improving its Doing 
business ranking between 2015 and 2019 from 142 to 77 (Gupta and Auerswald 2019). 
Digitisation is very likely to continue to help high-capability organisations reduce their 
transaction costs. Moreover, some of the corruption that these organisations had previously 
engaged in to evade these high-cost compliance requirements would also have declined as a 
result (Khan 2006).  
Digital identities: a political settlements analysis of asymmetric power and information 
 
17 
 
The Indian experience shows the kinds of areas where digital systems have been most useful 
in simplifying procedures, improving enforcement and reducing some types of corruption. 
These have typically involved violations by high-capability individuals and organisations and 
regulations that were poorly put together or had excessively high costs of compliance. The 
digitisation of regulatory compliance systems and linking these with identity data creates 
strong compulsions for changing procedures that affect powerful and potentially compliant 
organisations, as well as suggesting technological fixes. An important requirement, however, 
as the Indian experience also demonstrates, is that implementing agencies have to be 
technically competent, with close and trusted relationships with the state to push through 
these changes. India benefited from having a domestic information technology (IT) sector 
that was at the global technological frontier in many areas, and it had IT entrepreneurs like 
Nandan Nilekani who were close to and trusted by governments to drive through these 
technical innovations linked to state systems. Thus, even in these relatively straightforward 
areas where digital technologies can provide solutions, most developing countries are likely 
to make slower progress than India given differences in indigenous IT capabilities and trust 
and coordination between IT delivery agencies and states. In Nigeria, for instance, poor 
coordination resulted in 12 ongoing ID card projects in 2006, most of which were 
abandoned, and none achieved close to full coverage. The country is estimated to have 
spent around $2 billion on these schemes in ten years, double that spent on Aadhaar in India 
with a population roughly six times bigger (Gelb and Diofasi 2016).  
4.2. Less-powerful organisations violating rules including in 
the ‘informal economy’  
Cell 2 in Table 1 describes violations by less-powerful individuals or organisations of rules 
that they find difficult to comply with. The less powerful can be high-capability firms and 
individuals who are not connected to the ruling coalition, but the largest segment of these 
violators are relatively low-capability firms in the informal economy. Micro and small 
enterprises (MSEs) often find it impossible to comply with the registration requirements, tax 
codes, building, environmental, labour and other regulations appropriate for higher-
capability firms. As a result, a long tail of low-capability firms constitutes the ‘informal 
economy’ in these countries characterised by non-compliance or partial compliance with 
rules. These violators typically have to pay informal ‘taxes’ in the form of bribes and 
protection money to officials or mafias, but in this case the violators are more vulnerable 
and have little power to trigger changes in rules. If their violations become easier to observe 
and link with data on their identities, the outcomes may be higher extractions and greater 
political vulnerability for some groups. In this cell, better information should not be expected 
to result in improvements in enforcement and reductions in corruption. 
If there was a rule of law, improved information would have the same effect in both cells 1 
and 2 because the identity or power of violators would not matter. If rules were not feasible, 
there would be pressure to change the rules. But in the absence of a rule of law, better 
information about violations in cell 2 may lead to greater economic and political exclusion. 
First, better information is likely to lead to enforcement or demands for bigger bribes, and 
both can drive many informal businesses to close down, contributing to economic exclusion. 
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Secondly, information about violations can increase power asymmetries and contribute to 
increased rent-capture by the powerful by allowing them to differentially target groups and 
communities in populist or patron–client mobilisations. This can make it easier to mobilise 
target groups in the context of sectarian or populist politics as well as making it cheaper to 
recruit individuals in patron–client organisations to assist the rent-capture strategies of 
powerful organisers. Thus, better information about what is happening in this cell can 
further empower the powerful and give them greater access to illicit rents, while making 
some of the less powerful more dependent on protection and patronage. The potentially 
adverse outcomes in cell 2 are therefore linked to the greater extraction possibilities of the 
powerful described in cell 3, discussed next. The two cells are therefore linked as shown by 
the arrow, and in both, a reduction in information asymmetries is likely to result in greater 
power asymmetries, more serious violations by the powerful, and less-inclusive outcomes.  
We find limited evidence of information leading to changes in rules for these types of firms. 
Two factors may help to explain this difference. First, the productivity of a vast number of 
firms and organisations in developing countries is so low that regulatory tweaking is 
insufficient and any improvement in compliance is likely to require significant reductions in 
regulatory requirements or substantial improvements in firm capabilities. But secondly, the 
limited power of these organisations means there are no political compulsions for making 
regulatory requirements lighter. Moreover, the powerful usually want to maintain control 
over what they see as the disorderly activities of the informal sector, and to keep social 
order by enforcing the rules on some while providing clientelist exemptions for others. 
Better information can therefore strengthen the drive for enforcement and the emergence 
of clientelist politics of different types. Finally, many of the powerful are also engaged in rent 
extraction from the vast informal economy and better information can also facilitate these 
processes. The outcomes here are therefore mixed, but the evidence shows no systematic 
tendency towards regulatory simplification or the reduction of compliance costs for the 
informal sector. On the contrary, some forms of digitisation and digital identity systems have 
enhanced the capabilities of the powerful to control, exclude and extract.  
Consider the use of digital identity data to support financial inclusion in Nigeria. The Nigerian 
digital identity card, the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) card, provided 
identity data that in theory could facilitate financial inclusion in an economy where 65% of 
the economically active population borrow from informal lenders, rising to 98% in rural 
areas. The partial rollout of NIMC cards made identity checking less expensive and this 
enabled some individuals who had been previously excluded to open bank accounts. These 
accounts did make it easier to transfer money to relatives in rural areas, but did not result in 
more substantive financial inclusion because the new account-holders still found it difficult 
or impossible to borrow money with their limited collateral, low productivity and low 
profitability businesses (McGrath 2016). A long tail of informal businesses therefore 
remained excluded from critical financial services because their limited collateral and 
capabilities persisted, and they had to continue accessing informal credit markets. In Kenya, 
linking digital identities to credit histories resulted in benefits for banks by significantly 
reducing non-performing loans, but this was simply because it enabled formal banks to 
exclude borrowers with poor credit records (Gelb and Diofasi 2016).  
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The current distribution of capabilities in the informal sector is therefore critical for 
understanding the likely impact of digital solutions on compliance. Some high-capability 
firms (particularly those already partially in the formal sector) may become more compliant 
and their transactions may benefit from better information. But low-capability firms may not 
benefit. Firms with capabilities are likely to benefit if they had the capabilities to comply but 
had not been able to because of high costs of compliance. If the latter can be reduced using 
digital technologies, compliance and transaction efficiency can both be expected to improve. 
But low-capability firms may have failed to comply for different reasons; they may simply 
not have had the productivity or cash flow required for specific types of compliance 
regardless of the costs of filling in forms or establishing identity. Nor may they have the 
capabilities to benefit from high-value market transactions like borrowing from banks even if 
they could establish identity. This is why the evidence shows that high-capability SMEs tend 
to benefit from the enforcement of regulations, and low-capability SMEs are actually held 
back by enforcement (Mallett, et al. 2018).  
Tougher enforcement hurts low-capability SMEs, but some have argued that this is not 
necessarily a bad thing. The argument is that low-capability firms should be squeezed out 
because their violations give them a competitive advantage over high-capability firms and 
this keeps overall productivity low (Farrell 2004). But, in reality, the huge differences in 
productivity and quality between a high-capability formal-sector firm and an informal-sector 
one means that it is very unlikely that any non-compliance by the latter is going to give it an 
unfair advantage that would prevent the growth of the former. The more likely effect of 
enforcing rules on low-capability informal-sector firms may simply be to close them down, 
destroying jobs and incomes without compensating growth in the formal sector. When 
formalisation results in such an outcome we describe the process as one of premature 
formalisation.  
The decision of the Modi government in India to begin to enforce formal rules on a largely 
informal economy demonstrated many aspects of premature formalisation. The 
demonetisation of most banknotes in 2016 was justified as an attempt to crack down on 
corruption, crime and tax avoidance (as those with cash hoards had to explain the source of 
their cash to convert it into new money). However, by 2018 more than 99% of hoarded cash 
had been converted, showing that the powerful had found ways of persuading banks to 
accept almost all of their money. As almost no ‘black money’ had been identified, 
demonetisation began to be justified by the claim that it would move society towards a 
cashless economy where transactions would be on record and potentially taxable (Safi 
2018). This was followed by the imposition of the goods and services tax (GST) which was 
difficult to evade because of the range of instruments that were now available to ensure 
enforcement as a result of digital identity systems. The GST reforms did accelerate 
formalisation, though even its supporters agreed that its implementation imposed much 
hardship (Chowdhury 2019). Growth slowed for thousands of MSEs and SMEs as the time 
taken to refund claims of GST credit and complying with increased paperwork affected their 
cash flow, with potentially long-lasting effects on poverty (Mukherjea 2019). It is difficult for 
struggling entrepreneurs in the sector to remain competitive without significant 
improvements in their capabilities. A more inclusive policy would have focused on 
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simplifying regulations so that lower-capability SMEs could begin to comply and to assist 
capability development in the informal economy (Rajagopalan 2018).  
Consistent with the Indian findings, a study of informal firms in the capitals of Benin, Burkina 
Faso and Senegal found significant differences in the productivity of formal and informal 
firms, with the differences being greatest between smaller informal firms and others. The 
argument that informal-sector firms choose not to formalise is therefore only likely to be 
true for the largest informal firms, which already have many characteristics of formality 
(Benjamin and Mbaye 2012). Similar research in Kampala showed that 69% of the informal 
enterprises in the city were well below the threshold for company taxation and therefore 
unlikely to be choosing to remain informal to avoid paying tax (Kathage 2018). Yet smaller 
informal firms are not necessarily the ones that are less productive. In contrast to Benjamin 
and Mbaye’s findings, , a study of over 500 informal firms in seven African countries found 
that firms that employed fewer than three workers (the median number employed) 
achieved higher labour productivity than those employing more (Amin and Islam 2015). 
What is significant is that all studies show a wide range in the productivity of informal firms. 
For the long tail of low-productivity informal firms (whether large or small), digital tools for 
assisting formalisation may only raise their operating costs without creating the capabilities 
that would enable them to participate in high-value transactions in credit, insurance or 
capital markets. This is why studies also show that access to better information have had 
little effect in ensuring compliance or raising taxes, as enforcement often leads to low-
productivity informal firms going out of business (Benjamin and Mbaye 2012; Gelb, et al. 
2009). 
4.3. Extractive violations by the powerful  
Cell 3 in Table 1 describes violations where the powerful will not comply with feasible rules 
so as to extract from others. These violations may be underpinned by both asymmetric 
power and information. However, when the violators are powerful, better information 
usually does not lead to better enforcement. In a small number of cases there may 
occasionally be effective punishments, but these are usually cases where the individuals 
punished have lost power as a result of conflicts within or between networks. Enforcement 
is only likely to be systematic when the conditions supporting a rule of law have emerged. 
The arrow from cell 3 to cell 2 describes the invidious link between power, information and 
enforcement. The powerful are not only likely to violate rules, they are also likely to exploit 
information about rule violations by others to deepen their control and extraction. That is 
why greater information flows can paradoxically increase the asymmetry of power if the 
powerful can use this information to their advantage. 
In the political settlements of developing countries, the distribution of power is not broad-
based enough across powerful and productive organisations to ensure a rule of law. As a 
result, rules are often violated with limited recourse for correction. When the rule of law is 
weak, information will lead to enforcement if a powerful group takes an interest in using the 
information to prosecute and punish particular violators when it is in their interest to do so. 
For instance, anti-corruption agencies may be effective when directed by the ruling party to 
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lock up opposition leaders, who may indeed be corrupt, but corrupt individuals linked to the 
ruling party may be almost impossible to prosecute or punish. If information is commonly 
used in discretionary ways, it is likely that new sources of information linked to identities can 
lead to heightened extraction and new forms of political control by contributing to this 
asymmetry. This evidence is most developed in India as it has led the introduction of digital 
identity systems, but there is similar evidence emerging in Africa.  
Linking the delivery of welfare transfers and public services to Aadhaar in India has enabled 
the targeting of resources for political purposes and new forms of control or extraction. In 
the state of Andhra Pradesh, which has led the digital transparency movement, land 
acquisition for the new state capital was organised using Aadhaar identities, with records 
registered using blockchain technology. Blockchain makes it very difficult to change records 
once they have been entered, but the entry has to happen through human agency. Demands 
for bribes and coercion of poor farmers to give up their land did not stop. Indeed, powerful 
bureaucrats were able to use their own access to data to identify individuals who were soft 
targets and offer or threaten to manipulate the recording of transactions with them before 
entering this information into the distributed ledger system (Bhattacharya 2018). As the 
powerful could continue to use information in discretionary ways, the availability of more 
detailed information actually increased the asymmetry of power for some of the most 
vulnerable groups.  
In the 2019 Indian elections, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) began to systematically 
use public digital data for its own electoral purposes. It was returned to power with a bigger 
majority. Jarvis, a consulting firm, was given access to 150 million data points of 
beneficiaries of a public welfare scheme from every state. It then used identity data to map 
these individuals to their nearest polling station and developed applications for party 
workers disaggregating voters into castes, voting patterns, occupations and so on (Mehrotra 
2019). The Financial Times reported that BJP call centres contacted more than 200 million 
beneficiaries of various central programmes (Kazmin 2019). The misuse of social media data 
for electoral purposes has happened in more developed countries too, but in India identity 
data and data from public programmes were directly mined by the ruling party. India is 
currently considering a Personal Data Protection Bill, but this was already circulating in draft 
form in 2018 and had no effect on the activities of the ruling party.  
Even more worrying applications of digital identity systems are emerging in contexts of 
populist-nationalist disputes over citizenship and identity. The position of the Muslim 
minority in India has been vulnerable ever since the partition of British India in 1947 into 
India and Pakistan. The Indian state of Assam, bordering Bangladesh, has had a long-
standing movement against ‘outsiders’ directed at non-Assamese Indians as well as 
individuals identified as illegal Bangladeshis. In the context of growing violence, the Indian 
government signed the ‘Assam Accords’ of 1985 to organise a National Register of Citizens 
(NRC) to identify illegal migrants from Bangladesh, thereby also diverting attention from 
internal Indian migration to Assam. A cut-off date was established, and residents had to 
prove citizenship prior to that date for their citizenship to be confirmed. A massive process 
of checking documents began, but in developing countries vast numbers of individuals do 
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not have proper documentation of their birth or residence. Such a process was therefore 
always going to be fraught and open to local-level political manipulation. Evidence also had 
to be provided by community governments (panchayats) and local officials, and they were 
often alleged to have been biased given the growing anti-Muslim political mobilisation in 
India. In 2018, four million people out of a population of 30 million were identified as 
suspect, and in the phase concluded in 2019, 1.9 million were left out of the NRC, thereby 
becoming stateless.   
Unsurprisingly, the excluded included many from the targeted Muslim minority but 
unhelpfully for the BJP also included many poor Hindu households. The Hindu agenda of the 
BJP became transparent when they sought to reassure their Hindu constituency by saying 
they would reintroduce the Citizenship Amendment Bill that had not passed in the last 
parliament, this time possibly linked even more dangerously to an NRC exercise across the 
country. This Bill would ensure that Hindus who could not prove their citizenship would be 
deemed to have fled Bangladesh to escape religious persecution (even if they had not 
claimed this themselves) and would be granted Indian citizenship. But Muslims would be 
treated as economic migrants (even if they claimed to be Indian) and would not be granted 
citizenship. This deft tactic could potentially exclude around one million Muslims from Indian 
citizenship under the current NRC, and many more were it to be extended. The even more 
worrying precedent was to link the identities of excluded people to their Aadhaar numbers 
during the re-enumeration process. In 2018, the Assam government decided to record the 
reapplication of citizens who had been left out of the NRC on their Aadhaar records, making 
it easy at a future date to ‘switch off’ the access of these individuals to public services, 
passports and so on, effectively making it impossible for them to live in the country 
(Chakravarty 2019). The effectiveness of such a tool for further identity-based exclusion, 
bordering on ethnic cleansing, at some future date does not need to be spelled out.  
African countries with tribal, ethnic and religious cleavages that rival India’s should also be 
wary of the types of exclusionary strategies that could be facilitated by digital technologies. 
Less than 45% of sub-Saharan African children under the age of five have birth certificates, 
raising the possibility of significant manipulation of evidence when digital identity numbers 
are issued. The formal rules for determining citizenship are in any case deficient in many 
African countries. Many allow naturalised citizenship to be withdrawn on arbitrary grounds 
and half of Africa’s states allow revocation of a person’s birth nationality (Gelb and Diofasi 
2016). The ethnic and tribal contestation over numbers is already intense. From its first 
census in 1962, census data in Nigeria have been manipulated by competing ethnic 
networks to increase or maintain the political representation of their groups (Fawehinmi 
2018). The recording of digital identities is likely to result in more intensified manipulation, 
and as the Indian experience shows, the forms of exclusion may become more severe and 
permanent. An African example is that of Fulani herdsmen in Ghana, many of whom were 
excluded from the National Identification Exercise (Kaderi and Schareika 2015).  
As digitisation allows identities to be linked to public services, bank accounts, mobile phones 
and so on, there are more rapid and more severe consequences for the excluded (GSMA 
2017: 12). The Carter Center (2013) reports that tribal and traditional leaders already 
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provide evidence on applications for national identity in Sudan and Zanzibar. In Cameroon, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya and South Africa, opposition supporters have found it difficult to get 
identity cards. The consequences of discretionary powers will be greatly amplified as digital 
identities become more important. The weak rule of law in developing countries means that 
these problems are unlikely to be addressed by passing laws on citizenship, making the 
national identity authority autonomous, or establishing regulatory limits on the use of digital 
identities, as many such laws already exist. 
Our assessment of the likely adverse effects of digital identity systems on power 
asymmetries radically modifies the earlier expectation that new technologies like Facebook 
may make it easier for the less powerful to organise and put pressure on states for reform. 
Around the time of the Arab Spring that was a plausible expectation. However, the evidence 
of how the technological arms race has proceeded suggests that the powerful now have 
tools that make collective action and mobilisation more, not less, difficult than before. New 
surveillance technologies linked to digital identities that are in turn linked to many other 
vital aspects of a citizen’s life – including their welfare entitlements, bank accounts, sim 
cards, and even nationality and residence status – have made it easy to identify Facebook 
and other platform users and use more or less subtle methods to encourage them to desist. 
The use of social media for organising significant social protests has consequently declined in 
developing countries and is likely to decline further as surveillance technologies that are 
being rapidly developed in countries like China, Israel and India are likely to be rapidly 
adopted by other developing countries.  
There is an optimistic but entirely hypothetical scenario where the interaction between cells 
2 and 3 can result in a positive dynamic. Better information about the types of violations by 
the less powerful could in principle be used to revise rules in line with capabilities, restricting 
enforcement to rules that are feasible for low-capability organisations. Low-capability 
organisations could be simultaneously supported to raise their productivity and capabilities, 
allowing more rules to be enforced over time. Such a benign strategy could accelerate both 
growth and the pace of formalisation. More critically, it could accelerate the broadening of 
power in society as competitive rule-following firms begin to multiply. In time these firms 
may effectively demand a rule of law. Unfortunately, this optimistic scenario requires many 
unrealistic assumptions. It requires a benign coalition of the powerful to calibrate 
enforcement in this way over a long period, a coalition that altruistically foregoes easy rent 
opportunities to use information to extract and to demobilise opposition. It is much more 
likely that the powerful will be rationally selfish.  
The dynamic path that actually emerges when digital identity systems are introduced will 
depend not only on the calibration and sequencing of digital strategies, but also on the initial 
asymmetries of power described by the political settlement. A ruling coalition that can 
effectively calibrate and implement enforcement along an inclusive path (or is forced to do 
so in response to pressure from society) is likely to be one that relies on the support of all 
major ethnic, religious and other identities in a country, and is able to discipline its own 
supporters who may want to misuse information lower down the power pyramid. If, as is 
more likely, support for the ruling coalition comes from a few communities or regions, or the 
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coalition finds it difficult to discipline its own supporters, digital data is likely to be used in 
discriminatory ways to exclude some groups and reward others to capture rents, votes or to 
otherwise strengthen the ruling coalition. The inclusive path also requires a ruling coalition 
that is able to benefit from longer-term growth since the benefits of this path take longer to 
appear. If the ruling coalition is vulnerable and has a short time horizon, it will find it easier 
to reward its supporters with extractive strategies. An evaluation of the likely outcome of a 
digital identity strategy therefore also needs to assess the characteristics of the ruling 
coalition and the political settlement in the country to determine the dynamic path that is 
most likely to emerge.  
4.4. Opportunistic violations based on asymmetric 
information 
Finally, cell 4 in Table 1 describes opportunistic violations that are most consistent with 
asymmetric information problems. Here, less powerful agents skim rents by exploiting their 
asymmetric information advantage to violate contracts. Better information about identities 
and violations is likely to result in better enforcement and reduced corruption and fraud for 
these types of violations. The violators are less powerful by assumption, and information is 
likely to lead to enforcement. However, there is an important exception even to this. Many 
agents who appear not to be powerful may often turn out to be clients of powerful patrons 
who protect them. In this case, the ultimate rule-violator is not the ostensible lower-level 
agent but a powerful coalition in which the agent is simply a lower-level functionary. These 
violations should, of course, be correctly located in cell 3, where the violator is powerful 
because of network connections, and where enforcement is likely to be difficult. Finally, 
even if the violator is not so networked, the powerful may sometimes still drag their feet on 
enforcement to ensure that similar cases where they or their clients are involved are not 
pursued. Nevertheless, better information flows are most likely to have a positive effect on 
contract enforcement, particularly for service-delivery outcomes, if the violations are 
located in cell 4.  
Opportunistic contract-violations due to asymmetric information are most likely to be 
effectively addressed by digital technologies. Linking service delivery or other entitlement 
records to digital identities makes it easier for principals to detect violations by their agents. 
And, if the public officials involved in the violations are lower-level functionaries who are 
less powerful than (some of) their principals, the probability of enforcement may be high, 
even with a weak rule of law.  
An important justification for Aadhaar was that it would help to reduce corruption in welfare 
programmes and service delivery. Several types of fraud can affect welfare programmes. 
Identity fraud occurs when the wrong individual is targeted for a benefit, eligibility fraud 
when the individual is correctly identified but is not eligible for the benefit, and quantity 
fraud when the wrong quantity of a benefit is transferred. Through a process called 
‘seeding’, a person’s Aadhaar UID number can be linked to their name on another database, 
for instance the database for entitlements to the public distribution of subsidised staples. 
Names on the entitlement list without UID numbers are then automatically deleted. This 
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ensures that resources do not go to made-up individuals and there is no duplication. The 
evidence suggests that biometric identification systems have played a role in reducing 
identity fraud, but have had a limited effect on curbing eligibility fraud, and an even more 
limited effect on quantity fraud (Dreze, et al. 2017; Khera 2017). The latter two still require 
human intervention to judge, and remain open to manipulation at the local level.  
In some states in India, quantity fraud still allows very significant diversions of stocks meant 
for distribution to beneficiaries. Eligibility for various schemes is based on criterion like the 
quality of dwellings or caste status, and these are subject to interpretation and 
manipulation. This is because technology cannot determine the poverty level or caste of 
individuals and therefore their eligibility. In theory the system could have been set up to 
allow individuals who are short-changed in terms of quantity received to record this in the 
system. But when the recipients are poor and powerless, the system is not set up to enforce 
their rights, even though formally they are the ‘principals’. The ‘ration mafia’, the politically 
powerful agents who are dealers in the public distribution system, remain powerful and any 
attempt to dislodge them continues to meet with fierce resistance (Mooij 2001). However, 
where the problem is mainly one of identity fraud, there have been significant 
achievements. The biggest fraud reduction has been in India where using digital identities to 
provide subsidies directly to bank accounts has eliminated 40 million ghost beneficiaries of 
liquified petroleum gas cylinder subsidies. In Nigeria, the government was successful in 2011 
in weeding out 43,000 ‘ghost workers’ from its payroll system as well as 17,000 fake workers 
from the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (Gelb and Diofasi 2016). 
However, even for establishing identity, digital and biometric systems are themselves open 
to fraud and technical errors can be quite serious. It has been possible for fraudsters to 
construct Aadhaar numbers based on cloned documents and biometric data. Moreover, for 
technical reasons, mandatory biometric authentication for welfare benefits can result in 
increased transaction costs and serious exclusion problems for the poor. According to a 
recent submission to the Indian Supreme Court by the head of the authority managing 
Aadhaar, the UIDAI, technical authentication failures in welfare programmes are as high as 
6% when using fingerprints and 8.5% using iris checks. In a related presentation to the 
Supreme Court, the Chief Executive Officer also revealed that failures were even higher, 
around 12%, when accessing government services in general (Somanchi 2018).  
4.5 Commercialisation and new power asymmetries  
Our focus so far has been on how the technology of digital identity systems is likely to affect 
different types of violations when the rule of law is weak. An important additional dimension 
that we can only refer to briefly is that the commercialisation of digital data with private 
companies can further deepen power asymmetries. The generation of identity data has 
significant commercial applications, but first-movers can achieve network economies that 
make it virtually impossible for competitors to enter later. Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ 
works very differently when it becomes a ‘digital hand’ with network economies, and profit-
seeking private behaviour may no longer be in the public interest (Economist 2017).  
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Network economies give first-movers a huge advantage because customers benefit by being 
on service platforms that already have many users. This allows a few companies to exploit 
huge amounts of data and offer cheaper and more attractive services than competitors, but 
they then enjoy historically unprecedented profits and influence. Even in advanced countries 
with a rule of law, regulators are struggling with this challenge. The involvement of the 
private sector in the implementation of identity systems in developing countries may help to 
finance infrastructure and provide financial and telecommunications services using this data. 
Initially this can improve service choices and enhance consumer welfare, but network 
economies can then drive the system in the same direction as more advanced countries.  
India’s Aadhaar Act of 2016 allows ‘any corporate or person’ to use the public database 
called ‘know your customer’ if they are ‘requesting entities’. A number of 
telecommunication and IT companies have already started accessing this database raising 
questions about data security and ownership (Ramanathan 2017). Mobile companies have 
been able to access the Aadhaar platform to identify citizens eligible to be offered digital 
financial services (GSMA 2017). South Africa’s biometric enrolment strategy has a robust 
legal architecture protecting privacy, but the profusion of databases shared by the public 
and private sector makes effective enforcement a ‘mammoth task’ (McKinley 2016). Nigeria 
has perhaps been the most enthusiastic in enrolling the private sector in the implementation 
of its national identity card system. At one point the Nigerian government even allowed the 
MasterCard logo to appear on its national identity card launched in 2014. The card could 
also be used as a standard MasterCard to make payments. This was later reversed because 
of intense criticisms on the grounds of national dignity (Nwakanma 2014).  
In contexts where the rule of law is weak, private firms cannot only acquire market power in 
the future, their collusive partnerships with powerful politicians can give the latter tools that 
can increase existing asymmetries of power. For instance, we have earlier referred to the 
role of Jarvis in India’s 2019 elections. The potential collusion that can emerge between 
private companies hungry for privileged access to data and politicians who can benefit from 
the advantage they gain by using identity data for populist targeting or electoral processes 
can seriously exacerbate and entrench asymmetries of power in contexts of a weak rule of 
law.  
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5. Conclusion 
Our distinction between the role of asymmetric information and asymmetric power in 
contexts of a weak rule of law can help to explain a range of different outcomes that may 
emerge with the introduction of digital identity systems in developing-country contexts. The 
theory and evidence suggest that a more nuanced analysis can assist in designing welfare-
enhancing digital strategies by considering country-specific political settlements, the 
characteristics of asymmetric power in different sectors, and the characteristics of particular 
ruling coalitions. 
Digital identity systems can have different types of effects on the enforcement of rules 
depending on whether the violators could have feasibly complied with the rules and the 
relative power of the violators. They can help to improve service delivery and reduce 
corruption in service-delivery violations where the entitlements and delivery requirements 
are feasible, and the violating bureaucrats and politicians are not very powerful. Such 
systems can also help to reduce violations by higher-capability and relatively powerful firms 
when rules are being broken because they are difficult to comply with.  
Better digital systems can create strong compulsions to simplify rules by making violations 
by the powerful transparent, and also by providing technical solutions to speed up and 
simplify procedures. For two other types of violations, we need to be much more cautious. 
The extensive informal operations of low-capability firms are in most cases not likely to be 
sustainably reduced by digital systems. Attempts at enforcing premature formalisation may 
be welfare-reducing if low-capability firms are forced out of business or if they have to pay 
bigger bribes to survive. The most problematic violations are the extractive strategies of 
powerful organisations. Here, digital identities are least likely to make a systematic dent and 
may actually increase asymmetries of power in society. It is therefore not at all an accident 
that authoritarian and populist regimes have been at the forefront of developing digital 
identity systems. Enhanced asymmetries of power can adversely affect almost anyone but 
are most likely to affect low-capability organisations and poor people who are more likely to 
be the victims of populist and exclusionary politics.  
The likely impact of a digital identity system will therefore depend on how it is applied to 
different types of enforcement problems. The enforcement problems in turn depend on the 
distribution of capabilities and organisational power in society, which determines the rent-
extraction strategies of powerful groups, and the feasibility of rule-following behaviour by 
different types of organisations.  
Developing countries dominated by high-capability productive organisations and a 
distribution of political power that precludes extractive, populist or exclusionary strategies 
by political organisations are already close to being rule-of-law societies. In these societies 
digital identity systems can accelerate the simplification of rules and reduce compliance 
costs to further improve rule-following behaviour and reduce corruption. These systems can 
also improve the efficiency of service delivery and reduce corruption associated with the 
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exploitation of asymmetric information by public officials. But in societies with a long tail of 
low-productivity firms in the informal sector, the distribution of power in politics is also 
likely to be asymmetric, with political organisations frequently using clientelist, populist and 
exclusionary strategies to stay in power. In these societies, digital identities will have more 
complex effects. There may still be positive effects for high-capability firms and for aspects 
of service delivery subject to asymmetric information. But there are significant possibilities 
of adverse effects on the informal sector and an intensification of asymmetric power which 
allows greater extraction from and control over targeted groups. Corruption of some types 
may increase as a result; political inclusion may deteriorate.  
In these more typical cases, the calibration of the rollout of the digital identity system is 
likely to be critical. Simply saying that better regulatory structures and laws are required for 
data protection and citizen rights will not do in the political settlements of most developing 
countries. To mitigate some of these risks, linking citizenship information with service-
delivery data is something that needs to be carefully considered given the emerging 
experience of the risks of exclusion for populist and exclusionary political reasons. Similarly, 
the possibility of increased transaction costs for the poor if they are forced to manage bank 
transfers or prove identity using digital systems can be mitigated by allowing dual delivery 
systems for an extended transition period. For instance, citizens could be allowed to choose 
whether they would prefer cash transfers or in-kind access to public distribution systems. 
The increased costs may be justified by welfare gains (Muralidharan, et al. 2017).  
More generally, our argument suggests that in the presence of asymmetric power and the 
partial enforcement of rules, a reduction in the asymmetry of information can sometimes 
enhance asymmetries of power. This paradoxical outcome can emerge because an initial 
asymmetry of power can skew who can use subsequent improvements in information to 
their own advantage. This is an important dynamic to keep in mind, and is why using digital 
identity systems to improve information flows can also improve welfare outcomes in some 
cases while worsening them in others. This interdependence of asymmetric information and 
asymmetric power makes it particularly important for both lenses to be simultaneously used 
in evaluating policy and institutional design in developing countries.  
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